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LEGAL PROTECTION OF LOANS TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORROWERS
Lajos Schmidt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, in introducing
the proposal for what is today the World Bank, John Maynard
Keynes predicted: "In the dangerous and precarious days which lie
ahead, the risks of the lender will be inevitably large and most
difficult to calculate. The risk premium reckoned on strict commercial principles may be beyond the capacity of an impoverished
borrower to meet, and may itself contribute to the risks of ultimate
default."' Three decades later this problem of the gap between the
developed-country lender's required risk premium and the
developing-country borrower's ability to generate an investment
return sufficient to pay that premium still confronts the world
despite 28 years of World Bank operation, billions of dollars of
foreign aid spent by the United States and other nations to
strengthen developing countries' economic infrastructure and despite the activities of the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and analogous institutions in other
Western countries.
Nonetheless, the problem, while still present, has contours quite
different from those visible to Keynes in 1944. The pace of development in the Third World has been uneven; certain countries, notably Brazil and Indonesia, appear to have accelerated growth and
borrowers in those countries are attracting foreign loans with relative ease. On the other hand, the landlocked countries of subSaharan Africa confront an immense struggle to develop; a struggle all the more exacerbated by the energy crisis and the concomitant cost increase in almost all things necessary for development.
On the other hand, the advent of the Euro-dollar market has
greatly increased the potential source of funds available for
* Partner, Baker and McKenzie, Chicago. LL.B., 1941, Peter Pazmany University, Budapest; Ph.D., 1942, University of Munich; D.J., 1943, St. Elizabeth
University, Pecs, Hungary; J.D., 1954, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Quoted in HANG-SHENG CHENG, INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES OF THE LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION 67 (1969).
Vol. 7-No. 3

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

developing-country borrowers. Created apparently in response to
Eastern European hard currency needs 2 fueled initially by surplus
United States dollars accumulated overseas, later by surplus Arab
funds and greatly spurred by the United States capital controls
programs, which have just recently ended, the Euro-dollar market
has greatly increased the number of lenders in international money
markets; many of the newcomers are American banks hitherto
without international experience but which have quickly adapted
to the international scene. The increased number of lenders has
made the Euro-dollar market increasingly competitive to the point
where insufficient demand by borrowers from developed countries
has led the more venturesome of the Euro-dollar lenders actively
to seek out lending possibilities in developing countries.'
It is in this search for new lending markets that the risk premium
dilemma described by Keynes re-emerges. Having acquired experience with the risks attendant upon international loans generally,
the Euro-dollar lender must attempt to assess, quantify and, if
possible, limit the risks (of making a loan to a developing-country
borrower) sufficiently to place the risk premium it must charge
within the range of the borrower's capacity to repay the loan out
of the return derived from its investment. Moreover, it is precisely
in this attempt that the international legal profession can best help
lenders face the enormous challenge of increasing the flow of capital from the industrialized countries to those less developed. It is
the purpose of this article to outline the additional problems that
lawyers face when drafting a loan agreement with borrowers operating in a developing country and to make some suggestions that
can hopefully result in the lowering of the risk of, and the consequent risk premium on, a developing-country loan, thereby facilitating the flow of capital to developing countries.
Additional considerations include the type of borrower and the
nature and purpose of the loan. Whether the borrower is a public
or private entity, whether the loan is short or long term, or whether
its use is for a specific project or general purpose-these factors will
naturally affect the ultimate document reflecting the agreement
between the borrower and lender. This article will discuss the influence of all these factors but will not delve into the problems
2. Effros, The Whys and Wherefores of Eurodollars, 23 Bus. LAW. 619, 637
(1968).
3. Davis, A Buyer's Market in Eurodollars,51 HARV. Bus. REv. 119 (1973).
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encountered in raising funds for a borrower in a developing country
by means of a bond offering, a matter that has its own peculiar
problems.'
II.

PROVISIONS OF A BASIC LOAN AGREEMENT-CAPACITY,
COVENANTS AND DEFAULT

A.

Parties-LegalCapacity to Act

Some of the legal problems of international loan agreements are
not unlike those of domestic contracts.' With regard to the capacity of the parties, there must be a careful examination of such
factors as the charter and by-laws of the corporation or international organization, the constitutional and legislative authorization for a governmental borrower, and central government authorization for loans to political subdivisions and other domestic entities. Aid of local counsel in the borrower's country is often advisable in conducting such examinations. For example, a government
entity as a potential borrower may have restrictions on its longterm international borrowing capacity, which requires Ministry
approval, while its short-term (defined as any period less than one
year) borrowing capacity is unrestricted. Contrary to a potential
short-term lender's reasonable expectation, even though supported
by the borrowing entity's interpretation, that the less-than-oneyear exception denotes the time period elapsing between takedown
of the loan and its repayment, the matter may not be settled and,
indeed, may be placed in doubt by a contradictory view from the
competent Ministry that the loan period begins to run from the
date the loan agreement is executed. Local counsel is peculiarly in
a position to be aware of such problems. Further, if a definitive
Ministry interpretation cannot be obtained and the borrower insists on effecting the transaction, based on its interpretation of the
loan period, by urging a loan agreement signing more than one year
in advance of repayment, the lender can acquiesce only if local
counsel determines that any sanction for violating the borrowing
limitation falls on the borrower and not the lender.

4.

5.

See note 1 supra.

For a discussion of the practical problems in drafting a purely domestic

loan agreement see Simmons, Drafting of Commercial Bank Loan Agreements,

28 Bus. LAW. 179 (1972).
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B. FinancialCovenants
International lenders also have a special interest in guiding and
assisting developing borrowers in order to protect the viability of
the loan from subsequent deleterious events. This interest may be
secured in various ways-specific provisions for the application of
the loan proceeds and negative covenants certifying that specified
actions (e.g., merger or consolidation with other entities) adverse
to the lender's interests will not be taken without lender consent.
It may also be important (as in domestic transactions) to protect
loan viability by requiring the borrower to adhere to certain overall
debt-asset and quick-fixed-asset ratios and to limit capital expenditures in any year by reference to the prior year's net cash
flow. Here the lawyer's role as communication specialist comes to
the fore since such covenants can be useful only if the communication gap between widely varying accounting standards and practices is bridged.
Even with successful communication, however, it may legitimately be asked what purpose is served by such financial covenants if accounting reports and practices in the country in question
are at best erratic and the distant lender cannot adequately verify
compliance. The answer lies in the self-enforcing character that
such covenants assume with the conscientious borrower who properly understands the operation and need for such covenants. The
potential of the self-enforcing covenants has been demonstrated to
this writer in another difficult enforcement context-that of license agreements with Eastern European countries.'
C. Default Provisions
The matter of covenant drafting is closely allied to the problem
of dealing with default provisions. Naturally, covenant breach will
constitute one event of default, but the peculiar problem of drafting default terms for a loan in a developing country centers around
the description of acts of bankruptcy and insolvency. Local law
and practice regarding these matters must be checked to determine whether the almost-formulaic recital of acts of insolvency and
bankruptcy, which customarily appear in loan agreements in developing countries, adequately describes the acts and procedures
6. See Schmidt, Licensing in the EasternBloc, 7
14 (1973).
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recognized where the borrower operates. If not, the lender may find
it difficult to prove, even to a court in a developed country, that
the borrower's action constitutes an event of default.
III.

ASSURANCE OF LOANS-GUARANTIES AND SEcURITY

A.

Guaranties

One of the principal ways a lender can reasonably reduce the risk
premium it must charge is by obtaining security of an adequate
kind and amount. While viewing resort to a developed country's
courts for enforcement of a loan agreement is at best time consuming, a lender is likely to view resort to a developing country's court
as a hopeless morass. Hence the preference for security in the form
of an asset or for a guarantor with assets accessible in the lender's
own (or at least a developed country's) forum. The simplest kind
of assurance a borrower can offer is, of course, a third-party guaranty made by a private person, a government or governmental
agency, or an international organization such as the World Bank.
Third-party covenants and guaranties can take many formspromises to supply the borrower with funds or foreign exchange,
to subordinate claims against the borrower or, in the case of public
guarantors, to give the lender tax exemption.
A mere promise to pay on notice of default by the borrower,
however, is not much of a guaranty, since the guarantor can normally avail itself of all of the borrower's defenses. An unconditional
guaranty, however, may be too vague unless express waivers are
constructively inferred under law. Moreover, in negotiating guaranties, a lender should bargain for the right to proceed directly, in
case of default, against the guarantor without first proceeding
against the borrower. Waivers or the issuance of a promissory note
serve this purpose well. A lender should also assure itself of the
guarantor's ability to perform any nonfinancial obligations and to
obtain sufficient quantities of foreign exchange. It might be mentioned here that stipulation of jurisdiction is especially important
in foreign government guaranties since the guarantee is not itself
a waiver of immunity, a matter discussed in more detail below.
B.

Security

If the borrower offers an assignment of revenues as security, it
is best to bind the third-party revenue source in a separate agreement to pay the lender upon notice of default. If chattels are to be
Vol. 7-No. 3

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

pledged as security, they should be easily marketable and removed
from the borrower's possession. The few items that satisfy these
qualifications include corporate stock, bonds (and other evidence
of indebtedness), gold and marketable commodities. Further, it is
desirable to have these chattels deposited outside the borrower's
country. International lenders may want to consider, if they are
available, certain new forms of civil law security without transfer,
such as gage sans possession or prenda sin desplazamiento, which
usually involve machinery or commodities.'
The taking of a mortgage on foreign real estate requires careful
examination of the law of the situs governing mortgages, real estate
and rights of aliens. Of course, the deed must be drafted and recorded according to local law. A primary question is whether aliens
can own land. The inability to do so, however, does not exclude
land as security, for various arrangements can usually be validly
established under local law, which enables the alien lender to receive the proceeds from the sale of land without ever holding title
to it. It is also noteworthy that in some less developed countries
(Indonesia is a good example) there may be no satisfactory means
of recording a mortgage. Since certain countries, particularly civil
law jurisdictions, may require recordation of the mortgage in local
currency, lenders must covenant to protect themselves against
depreciation of the local currency; 8 a revaluation clause, if legal,
is one possibility. Depreciation may affect other covenants, such
as insurance, and the parties may wish to plan to meet this contingency. In many civil law jurisdictions a mortgage includes movable
property on the premises. While broadening the lender's security,
this may greatly inconvenience the operations of the mortgagor
and the parties may wish to plan accordingly.'
IV.

CHOICE OF LAW AND FORUM

A.

Choice of Law

The parties' choice of law and forum can significantly affect the
7. G. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONoMic DEVELOPMENT FINANCING 239-40 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Civ. C. art. 1477 (1830), as amended, Madrid, Instituto de Cultura Hispanica, 1959) (Bol.); Civ. C. art. 2455 (1887), as amended, 6 ed. Bogoti,
Editorial Temis, 1969) (Colom.).
9. See, G. DELAUME, supra note 7, at 246-47.
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lender's view of the risk and value of agreement covenants and
events of default, as well as guaranties and security. The understandable attitude of international lenders can be condensed in the
forthright credo: "one judge, one law, preferably my own." Unfortunately, the determination of the law and forum governing international loans is not as straightforward.
It is always advisable to stipulate expressly the law governing
international loan agreements. For loans made by private persons
or domestic public lending agencies, the usual practice is to stipulate the law of the lender's country; for bond issues, the law of the
market of issue is usually specified. These practices are also common in loans concluded by international entities such as sovereign
governments and international organizations (like the World
Bank). Recognizing that their ultimate remedy was not in the
lender's country, some international organizations have elected
not to submit their loan agreements to the law of the borrower's
country, and have prepared their documents so as to be valid
under the law of that country.'" Regardless of this stipulation of
applicable law, it is advisable to conform the provisions of the loan
agreement to both the lender's and borrower's laws. This will insure that in case of a controversy, which may have to be litigated
in the borrower's country, the lender has the greatest likelihood to
prevail. In the alternative, international law may be invoked by
the lender arguing that no domestic law shall frustrate the expressed terms of the international loan agreement. The World
Bank, for example, includes in its Loan Regulations the statement
that: "The rights and obligations of the Bank and the Borrower
under the Loan Agreement and the Bonds shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms notwithstanding the law
of any state, or political subdivision to the contrary . . .,11
If there is no stipulation of applicable law in an international
loan made by a private person, courts may be expected to apply
the law of the lender or, in the case of bonds, the law of the market.
This is rather important since foreign governments, for reasons of
prestige, may not wish to specify applicable law in case of default
10.

Id. at 80-81.

11.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, LOAN REGU3 APPLICABLE TO LoANs MADE BY THE BANK TO MEMBER GOVERNMENTS,

LATIONS

No.

art. VII, § 7.01 (1961).
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in their public debenture issues. If the loan is to be guaranteed by
a third-party, the same law should be stipulated as that governing
the principal debt.
It should be stressed that the stipulation of applicable law is not
a substitute for precise expression of the intent of the parties about
what constitutes performance and breach, lender's remedies and
borrower's defenses since the law itself is subject to change. A
special problem is that of statutes of limitations for bonds or government debts, which vary from country to country. It should be
noted that civil law countries view this question as a substantive
issue controlled by the law governing the cause of action; common
law jurisdictions view the question as a procedural issue governed
by the law of the forum. Hence, there may be instances when it is
preferable from a lender's point of view not to specify the applicable statute of limitations.
B. Choice of Forum
A similar dichotomy exists with regard to the choice of forum.
In civil law countries, lenders often do not specify forum since the
nationality of the lender gives local courts jurisdiction.'2 In common law countries, lenders prefer to specify their nonexclusive
forum choice and also reserve the right to sue in foreign courts. A
stipulation of exclusive forum constitutes a waiver by the parties
of other jurisdictional rights and also binds successors and assigns,
a point which the Supreme Court in The Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co. ,3 case appears to have definitely made a part of United

States law. But a stipulation cannot extend the jurisdiction of a
court beyond its own subject-matter jurisdiction. For example, in
loan agreements, which provided for the settlement of controversies before the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the
jurisdictional stipulation was frustrated and of no effect since the
International Court only has jurisdiction in controversies between
sovereign nations.
Jurisdictional stipulations in loans between international parties vest jurisdiction that would otherwise be lacking. The effectiveness of such clauses in loans from private parties to international parties depends on whether the accompanying waiver of
12.
13.

See C. Civ. arts. 14, 15 (ed. Petits Codes Dalloz, 1971-72) (Fr.).
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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immunity is revocable, as it is in the United Kingdom. 4 In the
United States the question of revocability of waiver is enmeshed
in the still uncertain law of sovereign immunity. American lenders,
in addition to specifying jurisdiction, often have international borrowers "irrevocably" waive immunity and further characterize the
loan as private and commercial as opposed to governmental or
public.
V.

ARBITRATION

International lending organizations, such as the World Bank,
have been the most receptive to the use of arbitration clauses in
their loan agreements. This may be because the international legal
character of their transactions does not provide a convenient judicial forum. Moreover, the complex economic and technical nature
of their loans may also lend themselves better to arbitration by
experts than to determination by courts." 5 Generally speaking,
however, arbitration clauses have not been a common feature of
international loan agreements. In loans to governmental entities,
considerations of prestige and mutual trust may militate against
arbitration clauses. Furthermore, governmental regulations sometimes restrict or forbid arbitration provisions, particularly in public or government contracts, and thereby cast doubt on the validity
or enforceability of arbitration clauses. In loans between private
entities, lenders often (rightly) believe courts to be more effective
than arbitration in conclusively and speedily resolving differences.
After all, from a lender's viewpoint there is little in need of arbitration; the only issue is whether an event of default occurred and, if
so, a speedy and effective judgment for the amount of the loan
should be obtained.
Notwithstanding the preference of most lenders to leave the settlement of controversies to the courts, the shortcomings of reliance
upon courts of law should be obvious, particularly if the borrower
has no assets within the jurisdiction of the forum. To facilitate the
use of arbitration in international contract disputes, the World
Bank has sponsored the creation of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Under the definitive
14. See Duff Dev. Co. v. Government of Kelatan, [1924] A.C. 797; Kahan v.
Pakistan Fed. [1951] 2 K.B. 1003.
15.

DELAUME, supra note 7, at 180.
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regulations and rules, which came into effect in 1968, contracting
states and their nationals may bring requests for conciliation or
arbitration to the ICSID whose comprehensive rules prescribe procedures for selection of arbitrators, apportionment of costs, the
proceeding itself and the rendering of the award. It should be emphasized that the ICSID rules are not intended to restrict the
rights of the parties to agree on their own rules; rather, they will
apply only when the parties have not agreed on their own rules.'
That the ICSID has not yet been accepted and employed on a
broad scale can be attributed to the prevalence of those factors
militating against arbitration already discussed.
The major problem of recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards is the subject of a 1958 United Nations Convention. Reluctance to enter arbitration agreements has been due, in
no small part, to a winning party's need to initiate a judicial proceeding to enforce a foreign award, with judicial recognition and
enforcement a matter of grave uncertainty. The 1958 United
Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards 7 provides that courts of a contracting country will
not take jurisdiction of a matter that the parties have previously
agreed to submit to arbitration and that each contracting state will
recognize such arbitral awards as binding and enforceable in its
jurisdiction once the petitioner has complied with several formal
requirements. There are a few exceptions, most notably when domestic law does not permit arbitration of the particular subject
matter and when recognition or enforcement of the award would
be contrary to a nation's public policy.
The United States did not accede to this convention until 1970,
and it did not become effective in the United States until February
1, 1971. It is hoped that more nations will ratify the convention
(the United States was only the 37th nation to ratify the convention 8 ), since ratification by less developed countries may encourage lenders to make greater use of arbitration clauses, whether
through the ICSID or otherwise, and since this increased protection for international lenders will certainly increase the availability of foreign capital to the less developed nations.
16. ICSID R. & Rules 140 (Washington, D.C., 1968).
17. Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, opened for signatureJune 10, 1958, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 2518,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
18. Id.
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VI.

A.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Two Theories-Absolute and Restrictive

The problem of sovereign immunity is particularly significant in
transactions involving less developed nations, since in these countries, the government or governmental agencies are more likely to
be the borrowers or guarantors of loans of international capital. In
countries adhering to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity,
such as the United Kingdom, plaintiffs are barred from pursuing
all claims in court against foreign governments or foreign governmental agencies on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction.
In countries adhering to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, including the United States, a foreign sovereign is granted
immunity from suits arising from its public acts (jure imperii) but
not from those arising from its private acts (jure gestionis).1
B. Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity
1. Immunity from Suit.-Under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, whether foreign government borrowing is a public
or private act would seem to depend on the circumstances and
purposes of the loan. If, for example, a national bank guaranteed
the payment of a commercial loan by a domestic corporation, it
could be argued that the bank acted in a private commercial capacity and was not entitled to immunity from suit with respect to
such a private act. The inclusion in loan agreements of consent to
jurisdiction and an "irrevocable" waiver of immunity, and characterization of the loan as private and commercial, as opposed to
governmental and public, are not necessarily binding, but are useful as expressions of the intent of the parties. A second ground for
denial of sovereign immunity may arise when the borrowing entity
has an identity distinct from the foreign sovereign. For example,
there exists a line of cases, almost exclusively New York State and
Southern District of New York cases, holding on various rationales
that a foreign public corporate instrumentality, even if wholly and
directly owned by a foreign government, may be denied immunity
may sue or be sued
from suit if it has an identity distinct from, and
2
distinct from, its governmental shareholder. 1
19. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Victory
Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965).

20. United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.
Vol. 7-No. 3

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

2. Immunity figom Execution of ForeignJudgments.-Even for
those states possessing restrictive rules of sovereign immunity, an
area of great difficulty remains in attempting to secure execution
of a judgment that has been obtained against a foreign state. While
legal authorities are not in complete agreement, a distinction has
long been recognized between immunity from jurisdiction and
immunity from execution. 2' Under this distinction a foreign entity,
which has waived (or been found to lack) sovereign immunity from
judicial proceedings, may still invoke immunity from execution
against its property even when execution is based on the judgment
resulting from those proceedings.
C.

Sovereign Immunity-The United States Position

1. Current Rationale.-The current ground for sovereign immunity peculiar to the United States Constitutional system is the
deference of the courts to the foreign policy requirements of the
United States as expressed by the Executive Branch. United
States courts will normally defer to the suggestion of the Department of State that immunity be accorded; only when the Department of State makes no suggestion to the court will the courts
make their own determination of entitlement to immunity.
2. Immunity from Suit.-United States adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was the result of a letter from
Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the Acting
Attorney General on May 19, 1952, asserting that the Department
of State would thereafter "follow the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity." 2 The most authoritative discussion of the restrictive
theory to date in the United States courts is contained in Victory
TransportInc. v. ComisariaGeneral.2 The court in that case found
that there was no satisfactory method for applying the restrictive
1929); Coale v. Societe Cooperative Suisse des Charbons, Basle, 21 F.2d 180 (2d
Cir. 1927); The UxmaL, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass., 1941); Hannes v. Kingdom
of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (App. Div. 1940); Ulen & Co.
v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201 (App. Div., 1940); Dunlap v.
Banco Central del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct., 1943).
21. Sinclair, The European Convention on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 254, 273 (1973).
22. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser for Dept. of State to Philip
B. Perlman, Acting Atty. Gen., May 19, 1952, in 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
23. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
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theory under Supreme Court doctrine but since the restrictive
theory had been adopted by the State Department, the courts
must follow it. The court then made the following statement:
The purpose of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is to
try to accommodate the interest of individuals doing business with
foreign governments in having their legal rights determined by the
courts, with the interest of foreign governments in being free to
perform certain political acts without undergoing the embarrassment or hindrance of defending the propriety of such acts before
foreign courts. Sovereign immunity is a derogation from the normal
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts and should be accorded only
in clear cases. Since the State Department's failure or refusal to
suggest immunity is significant, we are disposed to deny a claim of
sovereign immunity that has not been "recognized and allowed" by
the State Department unless it is plain that the activity in question
falls within one of the categories of strictly political or public acts
about which sovereigns have traditionally been quite sensitive. Such
acts are generally limited to the following categories:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an
alien.
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization.
(3) acts concerning the armed forces.
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity.
(5) public loans. [footnote omitted]
We do not think that the restrictive theory adopted by the State
Department requires sacrificing the interests of private litigants to
international comity in other than these limited categories. Should
diplomacy require enlargement of these categories, the State Department can file a suggestion of immunity with the court. Should
diplomacy require contraction of these categories, the State24 Department can issue a new or clarifying policy pronouncement.
Although the court included "public loans" within the category of
"public acts," it is unclear how broad the term "public loan" is.
Does it cover, for example, guaranties of commercial loans or loans
made to state commercial trading monopolies?
3. Immunity from Execution.-It is clear, however, that the
State Department adheres to a policy of absolute immunity from
execution for foreign sovereigns. The State Department's position
in this area is best presented in its own words from its suggestion
24.

336 F.2d at 360.
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of immunity of June 22, 1959, presented in the case of Stephen v.
Zivnostenska Banka, National Corp.:2
"However, the Department has always recognized a distinction
between 'immunity from jurisdiction' and 'immunity from execution.' The Department has maintained the view that in accordance
with international law property of a foreign sovereign is immune
from execution to satisfy even a judgment obtained in an action
against a foreign sovereign where there is no immunity from suit.
The Department is of the further view that, where under international law a foreign government is not immune from suit, attachment of its property for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction is not
prohibited. In many cases jurisdiction could probably not be obtained otherwise. But property so attached to obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant government cannot be retained to satisfy a judgment ensuing from the suit because in accordance with international law the property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution even
in a case where the foreign sovereign is not immune from
26
suit."

Since case law regarding sovereign immunity from execution is
sparse and inconclusive, ultimate court acceptance or rejection of
the foregoing State Department view cannot be foretold. Consequently, under existing United States law, American lenders contemplating loans to foreign governmental agencies or to other entities guaranteed by foreign governments must carefully evaluate
the risks of such a loan in light of the complex United States
attitude towards sovereign immunity.
D. Draft Bill on Sovereign Immunity
Fortunately, a joint Department of State-Department of Justice
proposal to streamline the United States law of sovereign immunity has been introduced in Congress.27 The draft bill is entitled:
"An act to define the circumstances in which foreign states are
immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts and in which
execution may not be levied on their assets, and for other purposes
." and is intended to accomplish basically four things:
(1)
25.
26.
27.

The task of determining whether a foreign state is enti-

222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1961).
222 N.Y.S.2d at 133, 134.
S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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tled to immunity would be transferred wholly to the courts,
and the Department of State would no longer express itself on
requests for immunity directed to it by the courts or by foreign
states.
(2) The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity would be
further particularized in statutory form.
(3) Foreign states would no longer be accorded absolute
immunity from execution on judgments rendered against
them, as is now the case, and their immunity from execution
would conform more closely to the restrictive theory of immunity from suit.
(4) The means whereby process may be served on foreign
states would be specified.n
Of particular interest are the provisions that make irrevocable
any waiver of immunity from jurisdiction or execution. While preserving immunity in any case "relating to" public debt, the bill
defines "public debt" for this purpose as a debt incurred by the
foreign sovereign itself, specifically excluding any case that "relates to" the public debt of a political subdivision or agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state. The bill, however, requires some
redrafting to eliminate the vagueness that surrounds the contemporary verb "to relate." It should also be noted that the assets in
the United States of a foreign central bank will be absolutely immune from attachment and execution under the proposed law.
The chances for passage of this much needed but relatively unknown bill by a preoccupied Congress cannot be determined. The
bill is well conceived and deserving of serious consideration. Further, its passage would greatly simplify one important aspect of
estimating the risk of international loans and investments and
also, by making waivers of immunity irrevocable, simplify the negotiation of international loan agreements.
VII.

MONETARY CONSIDERATIONS

In all dealings in foreign currencies, the parties must be concerned with the problem of transferability. Lenders must assure
themselves that satisfactory payment will be made despite depre28. Letter from William P. Rogers, Secretary of State, and Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney-General, to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives,
January 16, 1973.
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ciation of currency or exchange controls. In many cases, lenders
will simply seek to have the loan denominated in their own currency. This is the common practice in intergovernmental loans."
International lending organizations such as the World Bank, however, are obviously in a special situation since their capital reserves
consist of subscription payments. By imposing value maintenance
clauses, the risk of depreciation may be shifted to either the international organization's lender-member or borrower. In these days
of both United States dollar and gold instability, it may be expected that more international organizations will follow the World
Bank practice of shifting the risk to members by obliging them to
make additional payment in the event of the depreciation of their
currency.
In the private sector, when the borrower has the bargaining
power to resist repayment in the lender's currency, lenders have
traditionally sought to protect themselves by denominating the
loan alternatively in gold or in multiple currencies. In the United
States the legality of such currency options when the United States
dollar is one of the option currencies is uncertain because of a 1933
Joint Resolution of Congress on the basis of which the Supreme
Court declared one such currency option to be against public policy when the United States dollar was one of the option currencies.3 1 Mere currency options, while protecting the lender, expose
the borrower to the risk of upward revaluation, and for this reason
may be unacceptable. Alternatives include denominating a single
currency considered stable, but such a currency may be difficult
to agree upon. Another possibility is to denominate the loan in a
"unit of account" defined in gold and tied to multiple stable currencies, with the provision that the value of the "unit of account"
will vary only relative to the most stable of these currrencies; however, unstable gold prices militate against this proposal. The latest
canon for denominating international loans appears to be the "unit
of account" composed of currencies of designated European countries.
Besides the threat of the depreciation of currency, lenders must
include in their planning consideration of the exchange controls of
the countries whose currencies are involved since the International
29.
30.

supra note 7, at 258.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939).
DELAUME,
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LEGAL PROTECTION OF LOANS

Monetary Fund Agreement makes unenforceable all exchange contracts contrary to the exchange controls of any member whose
currency is involved." In practice, lenders to countries with exchange controls, which includes almost all developing countries,
should obtain specific guaranties from the governmental exchange
control authority that transferable foreign exchange will be available to service the loan. It is important to note that mere compliance by the borrower with foreign exchange regulations may not
32
insure the availability of transferable foreign exchange.
VIII.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Political instability is a legitimate concern of international lenders, particularly when the loans are made to developing nations;
the possibilities of war, revolution, conquest and dismemberment
must all be considered in calculating the risk to the lender. The
borrower's involvement in war, however, does not relieve any obligations to service loans. If the lender's country is a belligerent
enemy, there will probably be a suspension of obligations due for
the duration. Thus, the burden may be on the lender to prove nonenemy belligerent status. 33 In the case of changes of government,
the international legal principle of state continuity governs,
thereby obligating the new government for the debts of its predecessor. While this principle has a long legal history, there is precedent for its breach, notably in the case of certain Communist revolutions.3 4 There is generally less respect for creditors in the case of a
change of sovereignty, particularly in a case of dismemberment
rather than absorption, even though there is a general principle of
succession to local debts. In the case of partition, such as Pakistan has recently experienced, the normal practice would be to
negotiate a division of the national debt. Of course there may be
substantial delays in payment of obligations in all these cases, if
they are paid at all.
31. Articles of Agreement with Other Powers respecting the International
Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, opened for signature Dec. 27, 1945, art. VIII,
§ 2(b), 60 Stat. 1401 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
32. DELAUME, supra note 7, at 302-03.
33. See Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch Atlantische Telegraphengesellschaft, 22
N.Y.S.2d 581 (1940).
34. Russia's public debt was repudiated by the Soviets in 1918.
35. DELAUME, supra note 7, at 323-25.
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There is no reliable protection for lenders against these risks.
The creditor's bargaining position may be strengthened somewhat
in the event of debt settlement negotiations by assignments of
revenue, pledges of security, or covenants to maintain priority of
the loan over other debts. In planning for peaceful transitions,
covenants to consult and maintain creditor rights may be helpful,
but such covenants may be objectionable as restrictions on sovereignty.
IX.

CONCLUSION

It is to be hoped that the international legal profession will accept the challenge presented to facilitate the flow of capital to the
developing areas of the world. This will require meticulous and
patient study of the laws and customs of foreign nations, which are
often very different from those the United States legal profession
is accustomed to. Recent developments in the areas of arbitration
and sovereign immunity bode well for the further development of
financial relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America. One area
of particular potential is the development of innovative new forms
of international guaranties for loans to developing countries.
In addition, revived interest in international law in American
law schools is another encouraging factor. More and better trained
practitioners in the international field can only mean greater
awareness and hopefully earlier development of solutions to the
immediate problems. This in turn will assure the continued flow
of funds to the developing nations, enabling the untold millions
living in developing nations to increase their standard of living.
This is the challenge of the decades to come.
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